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With the introductions of genetically engineered organisms (GEOs) into the environ-
ment over the past 0 years, there has been a growing number of questions and concerns 
about consequences for natural and managed ecosystems. An emerging body of research 
evidence shows that GEOs are viable and capable of reproduction with wild relatives in 
natural ecosystems. There is also evidence that transgenes can move from one domesti-
cated variety to another. Also, given the fact that future GEOs may feature traits that have 
the potential to significantly modify the ecological niche that these organisms occupy, 
there has been interest in developing methods and approaches to confine certain GEOs 
and their transgenes to specifically designated areas. Of the various methods available to 
confine GEOs, those that are biological in nature are of particular interest. These include 
induced sterility and related methods—approaches that, in some cases, have been applied 
to non-engineered organisms such as shellfish and crop plants. 
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The	US	Department	of	Agriculture	requested	the	National	
Academies	to	review	and	evaluate	biological	methods	of	
confinement	for	GEOs.
In 000, the federal government completed an interagency review of its regulatory 
oversight of biotechnology products. This review revealed that ensuring confinement could 
become a regulatory requirement for approval of some GEOs. In 00, the US Depart-
ment of Agriculture requested the National Academies to review and evaluate biological 
methods of confinement for GEOs and report on their application in confining transgenic 
crop plants, shellfish, trees, grasses, fish, microbes, insects and other organisms. This paper 
summarizes that report (Biological	Confinement	of	Genetically	Engineered	Organisms) with 
the hope that biological confinement methods for current and future GEOs will be given 
adequate consideration as mechanisms to reduce environmental risk.
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The expert committee convened by the National Academies was asked to address a 
set of six questions: 
• What is the status of scientific understanding about various biological confine-
ment methods for genetically engineered organisms?
• What methods are available, and how feasible, effective, and costly are they?
• What do we know about when and why methods fail, and what can be done to 
mitigate such failures?
• When these methods are used in large-scale applications, what detection and 
culling procedures can be used if the biological confinement methods have failed? 
What is the cost-effectiveness of these procedures?
• What are the probable ecological consequences of large-scale use of biological 
confinement methods on wild populations, biological communities and land-
scapes?
• What new data and knowledge are required for addressing any of these important 
questions?
The report is organized into six chapters. The introductory chapter provides definitions 
and historical context for GEO confinement. The second chapter addresses the questions of 
when and why biological confinement (“bioconfinement”) should be considered. Chapters 
3,  and 5 are the heart of the report: bioconfinement methods for plants, animals, and 
microbes are analyzed and reviewed. The final chapter explores biological and operational 
opportunities and constraints for bioconfinement, examines the potential for confine-
ment failure and mitigation, and looks to the future in terms of unanswered research 
questions and needs that should be addressed in order for bioconfinement methods for 
GEOs to be successful.
Definition of Bioconfinement
There is a fundamental assumption in the report that the movement of GEOs or their 
genetic material might need to be restricted to designated areas, which in turn creates the 
need for confinement. Three types of confinement are defined—physical, physicochemical 
and biological—each involving barriers that prevent the survival, spread, or reproduction 
of the organism in the natural environment. Bioconfinement refers to the methods that 
utilize biological mechanisms to achieve confinement.
When and Why to Consider Bioconfinement?
The report repeatedly acknowledges that many, if not most, GEOs will not require biocon-
finement. Each should be determined on a case-by-case basis that takes into consideration 
the risk associated with the escape of the GEO or its transgenes. The most commonly 
known environmental risk is that of GE crop alleles being sexually transferred to wild 
Many,	if	not	most,	GEOs	will	not	require	bioconfinement.
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relatives and conferring new traits that result in increased weediness. Other risks include 
effects of a GEO on non-target species (including humans). These range from potential 
food-safety concerns associated with crop plants engineered with genes expressing novel 
proteins not intended for the food chain to GE animals out-competing or driving related 
and locally rare taxa into extinction. 
The report notes that researchers and GEO developers need to consider the role of 
preventative action; in other words, are there options that might eliminate or mitigate the 
need for bioconfinement or that may also prevent failure of a given confinement effort? 
Such an assessment often presents a greater set of options in contrast to the often higher 
expense of remedial action. The question of “How much bioconfinement is enough?” 
must also be asked; an appropriate risk assessment, exploring the need for stringency 
and redundancy, will be influenced by the risks posed by the organism, its biology, the 
transgenes and other factors. 
The consequences of failure of bioconfinement are varied and are difficult to determine 
in advance. Potential consequences include negative ecological impacts at local to regional 
scales, and political impacts in instances where bioconfinement failure results in significant 
impacts for human or environmental health, followed by public outcry or concerns that 
the failure was due to negligence or inadequate regulatory oversight.
Plants
Many approaches are possible for the bioconfinement of plants, due in large part to the 
diversity of reproductive strategies they employ. Of the methods discussed in the report, 
a few are based on existing agronomic and horticultural practices. Other methods are 
newly developed and untested or are merely working hypotheses. An evaluation of the 
strengths and weaknesses is included in the discussion of each method. As a whole, the 
methods typically target sexual and/or vegetative reproduction. 
The report also evaluates these methods for their effectiveness at different special and 
temporal scales, given that they are the equivalent to natural mechanisms of reproductive 
isolation that act to maintain species barriers. In nearly every instance, bioconfinement 
of reduced numbers of GE plants planted in smaller regions for shorter periods of time 
is likely to be more successful than efforts with larger numbers planted over larger areas 
and when confinement needs to be maintained for longer periods of time.
These issues become more important as genetic engineering is applied to new types of 
plants, including long-lived species such as trees. Furthermore, new types of GE traits 
are being developed including traits that produce medicinal and chemical precursors for 
such products as vaccines and natural rubber. Our ability to combine multiple GE traits 
that make plants hardier and more prolific also presents potential environmental risks 
that might warrant bioconfinement.
Another	concern	involves	the	level	of	public	acceptance	of	sterile	
seeds	in	staple	food	crops.
Waddell
9 Agricultural Biotechnology: Beyond Food and Energy to Health and the Environment
Overall, the outlook for confining plants is positive. When recommended methods 
work as planned, there is no reason to expect environmental problems. However, the 
report acknowledges that nearly all of the methods have limitations, mostly in the areas 
of availability and reliability. This is particularly true for long-lived, clonal plants. An-
other concern that might impact the use of bioconfinement involves the level of public 
acceptance of sterile seeds in staple food crops. This issue was raised some years ago with 
the public perception of “terminator” technology that a company considered using to 
protect their technology and investment.
Animals
For the discussion of bioconfinement of animals, the report limited its focus to insects 
and aquatic species, in large part because these two categories are active areas in current 
GE research and development efforts. Consequently, they are likely to be among the early 
GE products considered for commercialization. Finally, the potential for negative envi-
ronmental effects from confinement failure is much higher relative to terrestrial livestock 
species. Of the methods evaluated, the best understood systems are those applied to fish 
and shellfish species, due to the success of aquacultural programs employed around the 
world. These methods focus on disrupting sexual reproduction by a trio of approaches:
• sterilization through induction of triploidy;
• combination of triploidy with monosex lines; and
• interspecific hybrids alone or with triploidy.
In most instances, successful bioconfinement relies on the ecological characteristics of 
the GEO and the production site to reduce escape.
The best developed methods for animals involve the induction of sterility. However, 
no method is 00% effective, and the success of any method relies heavily on effective 
screening for failures prior to the release of the GE animals. Some early data involving 
GE salmon reveal that a high level of screening for triploidy appeared to be cost-effective. 
As for transgenic methods of confinement, the report acknowledges that they are at very 
early stages of research, so much needs to be understood before such approaches become 
commercially viable. One lesson from current aquaculture is that it is very difficult to 
monitor for failures after commercial release. Overall, animals pose some unique chal-
lenges for confinement, but given the level of experience gained from aquaculture, our 
understanding of bioconfinement methods may be more advanced for GE animals than 
for the other taxa discussed in the report.
Considerable	caution	is	warranted	since	relatively	little	is	known	
of	the	ecology	and	evolution	of	GE	microbes.
Microorganisms
The use of GE microbes offers significant potential benefits, given that viruses, bacteria, and 
fungi are pathogens of insects and of a variety of other pests. Microbes are also capable of 
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degrading certain pollutants. With genetic engineering, this capability could be extended 
to a broad list of toxins and pollutants in the environment. However, considerable caution 
is warranted since relatively little is known of the ecology and evolution of GE microbes. 
Furthermore, since reproduction is asexual in bacteria and often clonal in viruses, the 
methods developed for inducing sterility in plant and animals are not appropriate for 
many microbial species.
There are two major categories of bioconfinement methods. One focuses on “fitness 
reduction” for microbes. With “phenotypic handicapping,” the energy costs of expressing 
the GE trait causes a loss in competitive ability relative to naturally occurring microbes in 
the environment. The success of this confinement effort depends on the persistence of the 
GE-microbe population under such a handicap. However, a limitation with this method is 
the fact that microbes rapidly reproduce and can mutate, so subsequent generations may 
be more adapted to the environmental conditions and may be capable of coexistence. 
The second category, “suicide” genes, is oriented to confining the GE microbes in the 
wild. The mechanism involves the GEO carrying a suicide gene that is repressed while 
the microbe is “working”—for example metabolizing a pollutant in a lake—and is ac-
tivated when the microbe is no longer metabolizing the chemical in question, resulting 
in programmed death. 
One reality regarding GE microbes must be acknowleged. It is virtually impossible at 
this time to completely eliminate specific genotypes (GE genotypes for this discussion) 
in natural populations of microbes. This needs to be considered when deciding whether 
a GE microbe should be released into the environment.
Biological and Operational Considerations 
The bioconfinement methods characterized for plants, animals, and microbes share three 
features:
• all methods have strengths and weaknesses;
• all vary in efficacy depending on circumstances; and 
• no method will achieve 00% confinement. 
As noted earlier, in many cases GEOs will not require bioconfinement. For all three taxa 
the efficacy of bioconfinement will depend on the organism, the environment, and the 
temporal and spatial scales over which the organism is introduced. 
report recommendations
Given these shared features of bioconfinement methods, the report provides a number 
of recommendations (in italics):
•	 Evaluation	of	the	need	for	bioconfinement	should	be	considered	for	each	GEO	separately.
The report emphasizes making biosafety a primary goal from the start of developing any 
new GEO. This will be an efficient and effective way to prevent safety failures.
•	 The	need	for	bioconfinement	should	be	evaluated	in	the	early	stages	of	development	of	
a	GEO	or	its	products.
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Because methods can fail, and because it is unlikely that 00% confinement will be 
achieved by a single method, it is thought that redundancy in confinement methodology 
will decrease the probability of failing to attain the desired result. It is also understood that 
the spatial or temporal scale of a GEO field release can influence the potential for confine-
ment failure. The appropriate confinement option will depend on scale. Therefore,
•	 Bioconfinement	techniques	should	be	assessed	with	reference	to	the	temporal	and	spa-
tial	scales	of	field	release.	
The question of “How much bioconfinement is enough?” is challenging to answer with 
most GEOs, but with a systematic risk assessment and management approach, 
•	 An	adequate	level	of	bioconfinement	should	be	defined	early	in	the	development	of	a	
GEO,	after	considering	worst-case	scenarios	and	the	probability	of	their	occurrence.	
Following the decision to develop a new GEO, after a risk assessment, and the research 
to validate the assessment,
•	 An	integrated	confinement	system	(ICS)	approach	should	be	used	in	deployment	of	the	
GEO.
The ICS includes a number of features familiar to those who use best-management prac-
tices in the workplace. The recommended ICS approach includes 
• Commitment to confinement by senior decision-makers
• Establishment of a written plan for redundant confinement measures to be imple-
mented, including documentation, monitoring, and remediation 
• training of employees
• Dedication of permanent staff to maintain continuity
• Use of good management practices for applying confinement measures 
• Periodic audits by an independent entity to ensure that all elements are in place 
and working well
• Periodic internal review and adjustment to permit adaptive management of the 
system in light of lessons learned
• reporting to an appropriate regulatory body
Looking Ahead
Much of the report focuses on the front end of the process where determining whether, 
what kind and how much bioconfinement is needed. There is also the need to follow 
up once a bioconfinement strategy has been deployed with a GEO. Given the relative 
inexperience we have with GEOs and the deployment of confinement methods in the 
environment, the efficacy of the confinement system must be monitored. However, this 
is where our current knowledge is lacking and where our needs are perhaps greatest.
•	 Easily	identifiable	markers,	sampling	strategies,	and	other	methods	should	be	devel-
oped	to	facilitate	environmental	monitoring	of	GEOs.
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The fact is, the current lack of quality data and science is the single most significant fac-
tor limiting our ability to assess effective bioconfinement methods. Methods need to be 
tested in a variety of appropriate environments and in representative genotypes of the 
GEO under consideration. In order to implement effective bioconfinement of GEOs, 
the report recommends support for additional scientific research that 
•	 Characterizes	the	potential	ecological	risks	and	consequences	of	a	failure	of	bioconfine-
ment
•	 Develops	reliable,	safe,	and	environmentally	sound	bioconfinement	methods,	especially	
for	GEOs	used	in	pharmaceutical	production
•	 Designs	methods	for	accurate	assessment	of	the	efficacy	of	bioconfinement
•	 Integrates	the	economic,	legal,	ethical,	and	social	factors	that	might	influence	the	ap-
plication	and	regulation	of	specific	methods
•	 Models	the	dispersal	biology	of	organisms	targeted	for	genetic	engineering	and	release,	
where	sufficient	information	does	not	exist.
The objectives for this and any other research on bioconfinement are to minimize the 
risk or damage to human and environmental health. The success of these efforts will do 
much to bolster public confidence in the continued growth, development, and opportu-
nities presented by biotechnology.
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